### IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

vs.

Case No .:

2010 CF 1469

Division:

PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG,

Defendant.

# ORDER GRANTING AMENDED MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TO

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Defendant's Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief filed on February 16, 2015. The Court conducted a limited evidentiary hearing on January 8, 2016. Having considered the motion, the record, the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing, applicable law, the arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that the Defendant's Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief should be granted for the reasons set for below.

### Background

The Defendant was charged with DUI manslaughter (Count 1), leaving the scene of a crash involving death (Count 2), DUI with damage to property without serious injury (Count 3) and leaving the scene of a crash involving unattended property (Count 4). Attachment 1. The Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to Counts 3 and 4. Attachment 2. After a jury trial, the Defendant was found guilty as charged as to Court 1 and guilty of the lesser-included offense of leaving the scene of a crash involving property damage as to Count 2. Attachment 3, at 419. The Defendant was sentenced to 15 years in state prison for DUI manslaughter followed by one year of probation as to Count 3. The Defendant was sentenced to time served as to Counts 2 and 4. Attachment 4. The Defendant's judgment and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See

Armstrong v. State, 119 So. 3d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

As to Counts 1 and 2, it is abundantly clear that the Defendant was driving a car that struck and killed a man, named Paul Shirley, riding his bicycle. The Defendant's blood alcohol level, as determined from a blood draw hours after the crash, was 0.17. Attachment 3, at 179.

At trial, the Defendant chose not to testify. Attachment 3, at 315-316. However, the passenger in the Defendant's vehicle, Brittany Stanley, did testify. Ms. Stanley was dating the Defendant at the time of the crime. Attachment 3, at 98. Initially, Ms. Stanley was driving that night, but, according to Ms. Stanley's testimony, the Defendant wanted to drive so badly he grabbed the steering wheel and forced the car into a parking lot. Id., at 107. In the parking lot, the Defendant and Stanley exited the car and got into an argument. Id. Stanley reluctantly returned to the car as a passenger.

Ms. Stanley testified that the car traveled down Highway 98 towards Gulf Breeze and that:

There was a noise, and the car – there was a hit of something and the main thing I recall I was jostled because I didn't have my seat belt on and the sun glass came in.

Attachment 3, at 109.

After the crash, Stanley testified that she asked the Defendant what happened and she testified "I don't really think he said anything." The Defendant "just kept driving." When the car came to stop, the Defendant "reached over and opened [Stanley's] door and pushed [her] out of the vehicle and then told [her] to get out and go." Attachment 3, at 111-112. The Defendant drove off after a confrontation with a man (the evidence established this man to be named Christian Briscoe) who told the Defendant, "You hit someone on the bike." Id.

In addition to Stanley's testimony, the State presented an eyewitness named Christian Briscoe. Mr. Briscoe testified that he was driving that night and he observed another car that was swerving as if the driver was intoxicated. This second car cut in front Mr. Briscoe's car, narrowly avoiding a collision. Concerned that the driver was intoxicated, Mr. Briscoe slowed to increase his distance from this car. Attachment 3, at 46.

Mr. Briscoe testified that he did not see the person on the bicycle prior to the crash, but he saw a yellow-ish reflector. <u>Id.</u>, at 49-50. Then, Briscoe saw sparks coming over the hood of the second car. At first, Briscoe thought this car had struck a mail-box, but "when [he] came upon the spot," he saw "there was a gentleman...crumpled up into a bike." Concluding that the man was dead, Briscoe called 911 and pursued the vehicle. <u>Attachment 3</u>, at 50-51.

Eventually, the car Briscoe was following stopped and Mr. Briscoe was able confront the driver, the Defendant. Despite Briscoe informing the Defendant that he had struck a person, the Defendant did not surrender his keys to Briscoe. Mr. Briscoe's side of the confrontation was recorded because he was on the telephone with 911. <u>Attachment 3</u>, at 61-68.

As summarized above, the record conclusively shows that the Defendant was driving the car that struck Mr. Shirley and the bicycle he was riding, causing Mr. Shirley's death. Further, the State was able to definitively demonstrate that the Defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the crash was above the legal limit.

### Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Generally, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Defendant must show both deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice from the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In other words, for the Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, he must prove that that

his counsel's performance was unreasonable under the "prevailing professional norms" and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. <u>Taylor v. State</u>, 3 So. 3d 986 (Fla. 2009). The Sixth Amendment requires reasonably effective counsel, not perfect or error-free counsel. <u>See Terrell</u> v. State, 9 So. 3d 1284, 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

As to the prejudice prong, under <u>Strickland</u>, "[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." <u>Harrington v. Richter</u>, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792 (2011). "Post-conviction relief cannot be based on speculative assertions." <u>Jones v. State</u>, 845 So. 2d 55, 64 (Fla. 2003). For a <u>Strickland</u> claim to be meritorious, a defendant must show that he was deprived of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687.

### Post Conviction Proceedings in this Case

The Defendant initially filed a motion for post-conviction relief on November 12, 2014. The Defendant requested and was granted leave to amend the motion. The amended motion was filed on January 5, 2015. The Court dismissed the Defendant's amended motion on February 3, 2015 for failure to comply with the oath and content requirements of rule 3.850. The Defendant filed an amended motion on February 16, 2015.

On June 4, 2015, the Court ordered the State to show cause why the Defendant was not entitled to relief as one of his claims. On June 23, 2015, the Defendant filed a motion to amend the pending motion for post-conviction relief. On July 2, 2015, the Court denied the Defendant's motion for leave to amend because the Court had issued an order to show cause and the Defendant had previously been granted leave to amend. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(6).

The State replied to the Court's order to show cause on June 30, 2015 and conceded that an evidentiary hearing was required. On August 27, 2015, the Court granted a limited

evidentiary hearing solely on the issue of whether counsel was ineffective for failing to call an accident reconstruction expert to testify at trial. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on this claim. The Defendant was represented by retained counsel at all times in these post-conviction proceedings.

Claim Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Call Accident Reconstruction Expert

The Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present an accident reconstruction expert as a defense witness at trial. The Defendant presented substantial evidence at the evidentiary hearing in support of the claim.

To be sure, the failure to call an accident reconstruction expert does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Smith v. State, 154 So. 3d 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). "Ordinarily, where, as here, the defendant has identified specific exonerating testimony which could have been provided by an expert, an evidentiary hearing will be required to determine whether the decision not to present the expected testimony was tactical or an unprofessional failure on the part of appointed counsel." Terrell v. State, 9 So. 3d 1284, 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

The Defendant's counsel did retain an accident reconstruction expert, but failed to give the expert the information necessary to conduct his analysis. Ms. Herndon conceded as much.

See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing ("EH"), at 71. Despite the expert's documented request for such information, Ms. Herndon failed to do so. Due to this specific deficiency on the part of Ms. Herndon, the Defendant proceeded to trial without any reconstruction expert analysis to present to the jury. In fact, at trial, Ms. Herndon was not even aware of what such analysis would actually reveal.

On the other hand, at the evidentiary hearing, the Defendant presented an accident reconstruction expert who opined that, based on his review of the evidence, the accident was unavoidable. EH, at 43. Defendant's trial counsel, Ashley Herndon, herself concluded that the expert testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing "would have made a huge difference in the outcome of the case." EH, at 73. Ms. Herndon gave no reasonable explanation for her failure to provide Mr. Bloomberg with the information he needed to conduct a reconstruction of the crash. Rather, she simply said that it was a "complete miscommunication" and that "very well may have been [her] fault." EH, at 77.

In addressing such a case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire explained:

Further, had trial counsel consulted an expert, such as Lakowicz, he could have learned that another defense was available to him—that the accident was unavoidable, regardless of the driver's impairment. Had trial counsel consulted an expert, such as Lakowicz, he could have been able to present an affirmative case that the defendant's impairment did not cause the accident.

\* \* \*

"Defense counsel may not fail to conduct an investigation and then rely on the resulting ignorance to excuse his failure to explore a strategy that would likely have yielded exculpatory evidence." Gersten, 426 F.3d at 610. "[F]ailing to present exculpatory evidence is not a reasonable trial strategy." Id. at 611.

State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 774-5, 973 A.2d 299, 309-10 (2009)(emphasis added).

The Court finds this analysis persuasive. Ms. Herndon's failure to provide the necessary information to Mr. Bloomberg constitutes deficient performance and cannot be considered a reasonable trial strategy. In addition, this deficiency deprived the Defendant of a fair trial.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See <u>Daigle v. State</u>, 848 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("Daigle correctly argues that the State was required to prove the manner in which he operated his vehicle caused or contributed to the cause of the crash.").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> To be clear, the Court is not concluding that the Defendant would necessarily be acquitted at a retrial. The evidence presented at trial may entitle the jury to accept or reject expert testimony that the Defendant could not have avoided hitting Mr. Shirley's bicycle, particularly in light Mr. Briscoe's testimony. See Daigle v. State, 848 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The Court

expert witness testified at the evidentiary hearing that, in his opinion, the accident was unavoidable, even if the Defendant has not been speeding and possessed a normal reaction time.

The Court is compelled to conclude there is a reasonable probability that a jury would accept this testimony and acquit the Defendant of DUI manslaughter.

At an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction motion, "the defendant has the burden to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 3.850 motion. Once the defendant presents evidence to support the claim, however, the State has a burden to present contradictory evidence." Pennington v. State, 34 So. 3d 151, 154-155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)(citations omitted)(emphasis added). It is abundantly clear that the State did not meet its burden to present contradictory evidence. Indeed, the State introduced no evidence at the hearing to refute the testimony of the defense witnesses. Instead, the State relied upon previous trial testimony. When a Defendant meets his evidentiary burden of showing an entitlement to post-conviction relief, and the State fails to present contradictory evidence, there is no evidentiary basis to support a conclusion that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. See Polite v. State, 990 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)("The State was unable to provide competent substantial evidence that rebutted Polite's allegations. Polite is therefore entitled to post conviction relief....").

### DUI Manslaughter Conviction

As to the Defendant's conviction for DUI manslaughter, the Court finds that the Defendant demonstrated an entitlement to post-conviction relief based on counsel's failure to present exculpatory evidence in the form of an accident reconstruction expert. Therefore, this

is merely finding that there is a reasonable probability that the expert testimony presented could have changed the trial's outcome.

Court does not need to address the Defendant's other claims as to the conviction for DUI manslaughter (Count 1).

### Remaining Convictions

The Defendant is not entitled to post-conviction relief regarding Counts 2, 3 or 4, however. Regarding Count 2, Counsel's failure to introduce evidence which would support a defense that the crash was unavoidable has no bearing on the fact that the Defendant left the scene of the crash. In other words, even if the accident was unavoidable, the Defendant's decision to flee the scene is undisputedly criminal and the evidence of the Defendant's guilt on that point is beyond question. Likewise, the Defendant's convictions for Count 3 and 4 pertain to conduct that occurred after the fatal crash and expert testimony regarding that crash would not be relevant.

None of the claims for post-conviction relief entitle the Defendant to post-conviction relief regarding Counts 2, 3 or 4. First of all, the boot print evidence on the trunk of the Defendant's car is not even particularly relevant to those counts. Therefore, any error regarding the boot print evidence is harmless regarding Counts 2, 3 and 4.

The validity of the blood draw would be relevant to Count 3, but the Defendant has not demonstrated that his plea to Count 3 (or Count 4 for that matter) was invalid, involuntary or otherwise subject to collateral attack. Furthermore, law enforcement clearly had probable cause to compel a blood draw based on the facts and circumstances of this case. See Montes-Valeton v. State, 141 So. 3d 204, 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Moreover, the statute itself states that "The failure or inability to obtain an independent test by a person does not preclude the admissibility in evidence of the test taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer. § 316.1932(f)(3), Fla. Stat. Although the Defendant relies on the dissent by Judge Ervin, it important to bear in mind that this Court is bound by the *majority* opinion in <u>Smallridge v. State</u>, 918 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The statute imposes no duty

Counsel's tactics in cross examining Christian Briscoe did not deprive the Defendant of a fair trial as to Count 2. Regardless of counsel's tactics in cross-examining Mr. Briscoe, the record conclusively demonstrates the Defendant knew or should have known he was involved in a crash that at least involved property damage and it is undisputed he failed to stop.

Accordingly, it is **ORDERED** and **ADJUDGED** that the Defendant's Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief filed is hereby **GRANTED** as to Count 1. The judgment and sentence previously entered by this Court for Count 1 (DUI Manslaughter) are hereby **VACATED** and **SET-ASIDE**. This case is reset for the entry of a plea or a trial on the merits as to Count 1.

The Defendant's convictions and accompanying sentences as to Counts 2, 3 and 4 remain undisturbed by this order.

**DONE and ORDERED** in Chambers at Milton, Santa Rosa County, Florida on this day of February, 2016.

JOHN F. SIMON, JR. Circuit Judge

JFS/lew

Certificate of Service: (See Next Page)

on law enforcement to inform an arrestee of the right to take an independent blood test. Even Judge Ervin conceded that, "the officers may have been under no legal obligation to inform appellant of such right." Smallridge, 918 So. 2d at 608 (Ervin, J., concurring and dissenting).

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing order has been furnished via regular U.S. Mail (unless otherwise indicated) to:

	Michael Ufferman, Esq.
V	2022-1 Raymond Diehl Road
	Tallahassee, Florida 32308
	(via electronic delivery)

Zachary Brost, Assistant State Attorney
First Judicial Circuit
(via electronic delivery)

Don Pumphrey, Jr., Esq. P.O. Box 1818
Tallahassee, Florida 32302
(via electronic delivery)

Peter Felix Armstrong, DC # P47265
Holmes Work Camp
3182 Thomas Drive
Bonifay, Florida 32425-4238

on this Stay of Ma

. 2016

V Close

DONALD C. SPENCER, Clerk of Court

BY:

Deputy Clerk

ATTACHMENT # 1

Clerk Number 5710CF001469A-C. Arrest Date 11/27/2010 Agency # 10049975 FHP

RACE: W SEX: M DOB: 07/19/1982 SS#:



- 1) DUI DUBAL MANSLAUGHTER
- 2) LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING DEATH
- 3) DUI DUBAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OR PERSON WITHOUT SERIOUS INJURY (9812)
- 4) LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING UNATTENDED PROPERTY

# AMENDED INFORMATION AMENDING THE INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY FILED ON DECEMBER 3, 2010

IN THE NAME AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA

VS

PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG,

Defendant

Defendant

WILLIAM EDDINS, STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, PROSECUTING FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA, CHARGES THAT PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG, on or about November 26, 2010, at and in Santa Rosa County, Florida, did unlawfully drive or be in the actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in Section 877.111, Florida Statutes, or any substance controlled under Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, and was affected to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired, or with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, or with a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, and by reason of such operation of the vehicle did cause or contribute to causing the death of a human being, to-wit: Paul Shirley, in violation of Sections 316.193(1) and 316.193(3)(a)(b)(c)3.a., Florida Statutes. (F2-L8)

COUNT 2: AND YOUR INFORMANT AFORESAID, PROSECUTING AS AFORESAID, ON HIS OATH AFORESAID, FURTHER INFORMATION MAKES THAT PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG, on or about November 26, 2010, at and in Santa Rosa County, Florida, being the driver of a vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property, to-wit: US 98, resulting in the death of Paul Shirley, did unlawfully fail to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash or as close thereto as possible, and did fail to remain at the scene of such crash until he had fulfilled the requirements of Section 316.062, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes. (F1-L7)

COUNT 3: AND YOUR INFORMANT AFORESAID, PROSECUTING AS AFORESAID, ON HIS OATH AFORESAID, FURTHER INFORMATION MAKES THAT PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG, on or about November 26, 2010, at and in Santa Rosa County, Florida, did unlawfully drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in Section 877.111, Florida Statutes, or any substance controlled under Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, and was affected to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired, or with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, or with a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, and, by reason of such operation of the vehicle did damage or contribute to causing damage to the property or person of another, to-wit: Marcus Avalos, in violation of Section £16.193(3)(a)(b)(c)1., Florida Statutes. (M-1)

COUNT 4: AND YOUR INFORMANT AFOFESAID, PROSECUTING AS AFORESAID, ON HIS OATH AFORESAID, FURTHER INFORMATION MAKES THAT PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG, on or about November 26, 2010, at and in Santa Rosa, Florida, being the driver of a vehicle which collided with or was involved in an crash with any vehicle or other property which was unattended, and which crash resulted in any damage to said vehicle or property, did fail to immediately stop and either locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or other property of his name, address, and the renistration number of the vehicle he was driving, or failed to attach securely in a conspicuous place in or on the vehicle or other property a written notice giving his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he was driving, and did fail without unnecessary delay to notify the nearest office of a duly authorized police authority, in violation of Section 316.063, Florida Statutes. (M-2)

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF SANTA ROSA

Before me personally appeared the undersigned Assistant State Attorney for the First Judicial Circuit of Florida, being personally known to me, and who first being duly sworn, says that the allegations set forth in the foregoing information are based on facts that have been sworn as true, and which if true, would constitute the offense there charged, that said Assistant State At orney has received testimony under oath from a material witness or witnesses for the offense and that this prosecu ion is instituted in good faith.

ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY

JENNIE KINSEY

PO BOX 12726

190 GOVERNMENTAL CTR

PENSACOLA, FL 32591-0000

FLORIDA BAR NO.:0307350

PHONE: (850) 595-4611

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 20th clay of October

Notary Public - State of Florida

BRANDA E. WRIGHT MY COMMISSION # EE 091824 EXPIRES: April 27, 2012 Bonded Thru Notary Public Underw

ATTACHMENT # 2

1	IN THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY,
2	FLORIDA
3	STATE OF FLORIDA
4	Plaintiff,  Case No. 10-1469-CF
5	vs. Case No. 10-1409 Cr
6	PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG,
7	Defendant.
8	PLEA TO COUNTS 3 AND 4
9	JURY SELECTION
10	Proceedings held in the above-styled cause before The
11	Honorable David Rimmer, Circuit Court Judge, commencing
12	on Monday, the 3rd day of January, 2012, at the Santa
13	Rosa County Courthouse, 6865 Caroline Street, Milton,
14	Florida.
15	
16	For the State: JENNIE KINSEY
17	Assistant State Attorney 190 Governmental Center
18	Pensacola, Florida 32502
19	For the Defendant: ASHLEY HERNDON
20	Dewrell & Herndon  1261 A Eglin Parkway
21	Shalimar, Florida 32579
22	
23	Reported by: THERESA (TERRI) DANIELSON
24	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER Santa Rosa County Courthouse
25	6865 Caroline Street Milton, Florida 32570
	(850) 981-5593 • ORIGINAL 1

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### PROCEEDINGS

### (Defendant Present)

### (Courtroom 101)

THE COURT: Are you and Ms. Herndon still ready to go?

MS. KINSEY: We are, Judge.

MS. HERNDON: There's one preliminary issue to address regarding Counts 3 and 4 of the Information which is a misdemeanor DUI involving property damage.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HERNDON: And leaving the scene of unattended property.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HERNDON: My client, Mr. Armstrong, is present and at this point he would plan to withdraw his previously entered plea of not guilty on those two counts and enter a plea of no contest with the understanding that sentencing would be deferred until the completion of the trial on the felony counts.

THE COURT: All right. And that's Counts 3 and 4, correct?

1	MS. HERNDON: Yes, sir.
2	THE COURT: Okay. Do we have a written
3	plea agreement? If not
4	MS. KINSEY: Judge, I have not reduced it
5	to writing since it's misdeameanors.
6	THE COURT: I'll go through it with him.
7	Mr. Armstrong, would you stand, please?
8	Would you raise your right hand?
9	WHEREUPON
10	PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG,
11	the defendant, having been sworn testified as follows:
12	THE COURT: Yes, Your Honor.
13	All right. Please state your name.
14	THE DEFENDANT: Peter Felix Armstrong.
15	THE COURT: All right, sir, in Case Number
16	10-1469, you are charged in Counts 3 and 4.
17	Count 3 DUI with property damage, carries a
18	maximum penalty of one year in jail. And Count
19	4, leaving the scene of an accident, and it
20	carries a maximum penalty of 60 days in the
21	county jail.
22	Do you understand the nature of these
23	charges and the max penalties?
24	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
25	THE COURT: All right. Your attorney

indicates that you want to enter a plea to these charges; sentencing will be deferred until your Counts 1 and 2 are tried. Is that your understanding?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

1.9

THE COURT: All right. Has there been any representation to you as to what sentence you are going to receive on these two Counts 3 and 4 for which you are about to plead?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: All right. You need to understand the rights you give up when you enter a plea.

You have a right to go to trial and make the State prove these counts against you. You have a right to be represented by your lawyer, and the right to challenge the State's witnesses and the State's evidence, and the right to call witnesses of your own and introduce evidence of your own. You also have a right not to be required to testify. And if you get convicted, you have a right to appeal. But when you enter a plea you give up all those rights so there is no trial and there's no appeal. Do you understand that?

1	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
2	THE COURT: Is this what you want to do?
3	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
4	THE COURT: Anybody force, threaten, or
5	promise you anything to get you to do this?
б	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
7	THE COURT: Is this what you want to do of
8	your own free will?
9	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
10	THE COURT: Have you had any drugs or
11	alcohol in the last 24 hours?
12	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
13	THE COURT: Have you had a chance to talk
14	about this with your attorney?
15	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
16	THE COURT: All right. Are you satisfied
17	this is in your best interests?
18	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
19	THE COURT: All right. Then as to Count 3,
20	DUI with damage to property or persons without
21	serious injury, how do you plead?
22	THE DEFENDANT: No contest.
23	THE COURT: As to Count 4 leaving the scene
24	of a crash involving unattended property, how do
25	you plead?

THE DEFENDANT: No contest.

THE COURT: All right. I'll accept his plea and find it is free and voluntary and knowingly entered. There's an arrest report in the file that provides a factual basis for the plea. And the sentencing will be deferred until Counts 1 and 2 are resolved.

MS. HERNDON: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MS. KINSEY: And, Judge, I don't think it is an issue, but just for purposes of the record, it's a 90 day on leaving the scene.

It's a strange misdemeanor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MS. KINSEY: I have two things for the court file; a stipulation and an Amended Discovery that I have already provided to the Defense.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KINSEY: Thank you. And we are probably going to take a half-day on Thursday. So all day tomorrow and half day on Thursday.

THE COURT: All right. So Wednesday and half day Thursday.

MS. HERNDON: Yes.

ATTACHMENT # 3

BANTA ROSA COUNTY CLERK'S OTFICE

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Pensacola.

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Q Okay. Thank you. Did something happen that drew your attention to another vehicle on the road?

- A There was a car swerving in and out --
- Q Okay.
- A -- of the lane. Looked like they were drunk, yeah.
- Q Would you tell the jury about that?
  What's the first thing that you saw with this car that drew that car to your attention?
- A The car came around me, went into the fast lane which is the left side and he swerved back into the slow lane which is the right side and almost hit me so I backed off, and I just, you know, stayed, you know, back away from the vehicle because it was swerving in and out so -- .
  - Q So initially you were in the -- ?
- A Slow lane.
- Q Thank you. And then when it passed you, how close -- why did you think that it was going to hit you?
  - A It was about, you know, approximately a car length or a half a car length in front of me when it swerved.

- Q Okay. Now, you said where it struck the pedestrian or the bicyclist. Did you actually see the person on the bicycle?
- A No, I didn't see the person on the bicycle, but I seen a yellow reflector.
  - Q How far back had you gotten at that point?

    Were you right behind him? You said you had backed

    off so how far ahead -- ?
    - A Approximately, like, ten car lengths.
  - Q A head of you?
- 11 A Yes, ma'am.

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- Q Okay, but could you still see the car that had been swerving?
  - A Yes, I could.
    - Q When you saw the car cross over on to the shoulder, what -- did you see anything else? What did you see?
  - A There was a mail box, and it was approximately right in front of the old antique place right before the flea market.
- Q Okay. Did you see anything usual about the car as it crossed over on to the shoulder?
- A Yes, when it crossed over I thought it was
  going to hit a mail box so you can see a mail box
  some what. It's got like a green reflector, and

then I seen a yellow-ish reflector. It was kind of like small -- somewhat small, but then I see -- and as he went over on the dotted -- you know, the solid line, like, exactly when he went over on into the line, that's when I seen sparks coming, like, over the hood of the car.

Q Okay, and I know that you -- we've asked you a lot of questions about this case. This is the first time that the jury is hearing it. Would you explain to the juror what you saw with regard to the sparks coming over the car that you just mentioned?

A I mean, once the guy went over to the shoulder and was on the side of the solid line, you know, I seen the sparks and, you know, I thought it was a mail box or whatever, but when I came upon the spot where I seen that, there was a gentleman, you know, crumpled up into a bike.

Q Where were the sparks coming from the car?

A On the passenger side and you can see sparks coming over the hood of the car and the top of the hood.

Q And the top -- I'm sorry?

A Coming over the top of the hood of the car, the roof.

Q Okay.

- A. It was on the passenger side.
- Okay. Did that car stop?

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- No, he didn't even break. He, you know, A he just kept going after he hit that, after he hit the person on the bicycle, you know, he kind of drove perfectly after that, you know, until we started to get on the side street.
  - Okay. Let me ask, when you get up to where the area is where you see the sparks, what did you see?
  - Α Right in front of the mail box a gentleman crumpled up in a bicycle.
- Q Did you stop right there or what did you 14 do?
  - I slowed down, and I notice that the gentleman was, you know, dead so I decided to pursue the vehicle and call 911.
- 18 So was that man moving at all on the road?
- 19 A No.
  - And do you have some first aid or Q paramedic training or anything like that?
- 22 Well, I did volunteer up in New York, but 23 I'm certified CPR, and blood born pathologist, and 24 all that so -- but I seen that, we knew -- you know,

25 I knew the gentleman was dead.

1	DISPATCH: All right, sir
2	MR. BRISCOE: Give me your keys.
3	Give me your keys. Give me your keys now.
4	Give me your keys. Dude, you just hit
5	somebody on a bike, man.
6	THE DEFENDANT: No, I didn't.
7	MR. BRISCOE: Yes, you did, on 98.
8	Sir, yes, you did. Just give me your keys.
9	DISPATCH: Sir, sir, sir, sir.
10	MR. BRISCOE: Yes, ma'am.
11	DISPATCH: You do not need to engage
12	him in case it could become physical. Okay?
13	Where are you guys at?
14	MR. BRISCOE: We're on Shell Drive.
15	DISPATCH: What is the address?
16	MR. BRISCOE: I don't know, ma'am.
17	What's the address? (Unintelligible)
18	DISPATCH: What kind of vehicle is
19	it?
20	MR. BRISCOE: Don't go back in the
21	car. I'm serious, man. All right, Dude.
22	DISPATCH: Sir, sir
23	MR. BRISCOE: Look at your car, man.
24	Look at your car, in front of your car.
25	DISPATCH: Sir, sir.

1	MR. BRISCOE: Yes.
2	DISPATCH: I need for you to answer
3	the questions that I'm asking to get help to
4	you.
5	MR. BRISCOE: Get in the car.
6	DISPATCH: What type of vehicle is
7	it? Sir? What type of vehicle is it?
8	MR. BRISCOE: 5176 Carroll Drive.
9	DISPATCH: Can you tell me what type
10	of vehicle it is? I asked you three times.
11	MR. BRISCOE: The vehicle is a
12	what is that? A Mazda. She just laid down
13	on the ground. Mazda what? Mazda, gray
14	Mazda.
15	DISPATCH: What's the tag number?
16	MR. BRISCOE: It's 5126HS, and now
17	he's taking off again.
18	DISPATCH: 5126HF.
19	MR. BRISCOE: Oh, God. He just ran
20	into Asta Vista Drive, parallel with 98, and
21	he ran a stop sign. He's way ahead of us.
22	Baby, what street is this?
23	DISPATCH: Where's he at now?
24	MR. BRISCOE: Wheeler Road.
25	DISPATCH: So you guys are on Wheeler

1	Road. What direction on Wheeler Road?
2	MR. BRISCOE: Wheeler Road, Wheeler
3	Road, north on Wheeler Road.
4	DISPATCH: North bound, okay. Can
5	you still see him?
6	MR. BRISCOE: Yes, I can. I hope
7	that guy on the bike is all right.
8	DISPATCH: Okay. Did you when you
9	called in, did you ask for an ambulance for
10	the guy on the bicycle?
11	MR. BRISCOE: The lady I told get an
12	ambulance right away. Making a turn left on
13	Keystone Drive.
14	DISPATCH: The vehicle just took a
15	left on Keystone Drive, Kelly.
16	MR. BRISCOE: We're headed west on
17	Keystone Drive, right behind Midway Fire
18	Department. I'm in the GMC green van. I
19	know. I know. All right.
20	(Unintelligible).
21	DISPATCH: Do you still see the
22	vehicle?
23	MR. BRISCOE: Yes, I do. We're still
24	going this way on Keystone.
25	DISPATCH: The Mazda (unintelligible)

1 The complainant is in a green GMC van. The 2 officers responding are in an emergency so if you see them, I want you to get out of 3 their way. Where are you at now? 4 5 MR. BRISCOE: We're still on Keystone, left. 6 7 DISPATCH: The complainant is in a 8 green GMC van (unintelligible). MR. BRISCOE: And the car is in front 9 10 of me. He's coming to a stop. DISPATCH: He hit him on a bicycle, a 11 12 Mazda. It's in there. 13 MR. BRISCOE: There's a cop behind 14 us. DISPATCH: I'm sorry, the Mazda. 15 16 MR. BRISCOE: I can hear a cop behind 17 us because my radar is going off. The guy made a left on -- on New Height. He went 18 19 that way. He went that way, that way, that way. He went that way. 20 DISPATCH: Okay. Did you just talk 21 22 to the deputy? MR. BRISCOE: Yes, it's a sheriff, 23 yeah, I know. I'm at the address that I 24 told you, the lady just got out of the car, 25

1	and she laid down on the ground so get
2	another deputy over there.
3	<b>DISPATCH:</b> Okay. Can you still see
4	the vehicle?
5	MR. BRISCOE: It was a Mazda, a gray
6	Mazda.
7	DISPATCH: Are you (unintelligible)
8	or are you stopped?
9	MR. BRISCOE: I slowed down and
10	stopped, the sheriff I don't know which
11	way he went. He took a right on 98.
12	(unintelligible).
13	DISPATCH: Sir, when you stopped,
14	which direction did the car go?
15	MR. BRISCOE: The car made a left
16	towards (unintelligible).
17	DISPATCH: Sir, what's your last
18	name?
19	MR. BRISCOE: I don't know. She just
20	made a U back towards that address. I have
21	no idea.
22	DISPATCH: Sir, what's your last
23	name?
24	MR. BRISCOE: I don't know. The
25	sheriff went that way. It's a gray Mazda on

1	98, gray Mazda, four door.
2	DISPATCH: The complainant is no
3	longer he stopped. All the deputies
4	are
5	MR. BRISCOE: Midway, but we don't
б	know which way he went afterwards, the
7	sheriff.
8	DISPATCH: When you stopped, which
9	direction did the car go?
10	MR. BRISCOE: The car made a left
11	towards 90 with this road, New Hope.
12	DISPATCH: He took a left towards New
13	Hope.
14	MR. BRISCOE: He was on New Hope, but
15	then he went straight on New Hope and he
16	98, we drove back on New Hope. We're going
17	to make a right and now look for the
18	vehicle. I make I'll come up here and
19	make a right and look towards this way.
20	DISPATCH: Sir, what's your last
21	name?
22	MR. BRISCOE: Briscoe, Christian
23	Briscoe.
24	DISPATCH: B-R-I-S-C-O?
25	MR. BRISCOE: E.

1	DISPATCH: What's your first name?
2	MR. BRISCOE: Christian.
3	<b>DISPATCH:</b> Where are you at?
4	MR. BRISCOE: I'm sitting west on
5	(unintelligible) towards 98 and left on
6	New Hope.
7	DISPATCH: Where are you at right
8	now, sir?
9	MR. BRISCOE: Coming to a stop sign
10	right here (unintelligible) road
11	(unintelligible).
12	DISPATCH: And where are you at?
13	MR. BRISCOE: I'm turning left on
14	Sioux Trail. Is that Sioux? Sioux, Sioux
15	Trail. But we were on New Hope heading
16	sough towards 98 and we stopped and we
17	turned left on New Hope at the truck.
18	DISPATCH: Where are you at right
19	now?
20	MR. BRISCOE: I'm coming to a stop
21	sign right here. What's this road? Nathan
22	and Calle.
23	DISPATCH: You're at Nathan and
24	where?
25	MR. BRISCOE: Nathan and Calle.

1	DISPATCH: How do you spell that?			
2	MR. BRISCOE: C-A-L-L-E.			
3	DISPATCH: Calle, okay.			
4	MR. BRISCOE: I don't see his car any			
5	more.			
6	DISPATCH: Listen where do you			
7	need the complainant who seen the whole			
8	thing happen, where do you want him to stay			
9	because he's just driving around because he			
10	witnessed him hit him.			
11	Okay. Sir, what I need you to do is			
12	I need you to go back to the scene where the			
13	gentleman on the bicycle was hit, and I need			
14	you to wait in your vehicle because you're			
15	going to have to make a witness statement,			
16	okay?			
17	MR. BRISCOE: Okay, not a problem.			
18	DISPATCH: I need you to go back			
19	there. Do not get out of your vehicle.			
20	Stay in your vehicle and on scene till the			
21	deputies arrive, okay?			
22	MR. BRISCOE: All right.			
23	DISPATCH: Do not approach the			
24	deputies. We will let them know that you			
25	are coming in your vehicle.			

1	A	I grew up there since I was a child.				
2	Q	Okay, and how old are you now?				
3	А	I am 29.				
4	Q	Do you know Peter Armstrong the defendant				
5	in this case?					
6	A Yes, ma'am.					
7	Q	Q How do you know him?				
8	A	Long time friends.				
9	Q	Did you guys go to high school together?				
10	A	We did.				
11	Q	Were you close friends?				
12	A	Yes.				
13	Q	On November 26th, 2010, the day of this				
14	incident,	were you with Mr. Armstrong?				
15	A	Yes.				
16	Q	And at the time, were you two friends or				
17	were you	dating or what was the nature of ?				
18	A	We were dating.				
19	Q	How long had you been dating?				
20	A	About a month.				
21	Q	Let's start with during the day that day,				
22	the 26th.	Do you remember if you were with				
23	Mr. Armst	crong that day during the day?				
24	A	Yes, I was.				
25	Q	What were you doing that day?				

different than that this morning?

A I may have. I was concerned that he was angry and had been drinking. I was worried about that. He was really angry, and I didn't think he should be driving.

Q Did you also tell me that you were concerned about the amount of alcohol that he had?

A Yes, I didn't see the amount, but I knew there was something wrong.

Q So you start driving. As you were driving, what happens?

A He wanted to drive so he verbally said he wanted to drive and he grabbed the wheel to pull us over so we pulled over.

- Q Did that frighten you?
- A It did, yes, ma'am.
- Q And so when he yanks the wheel and you pull over, where did you pull over?
- 19 A I believe it was the I-Hop parking lot.
  - Q And is that the one in Fort Walton?
  - A Yes, ma'am, just a few -- a mile -- a few blocks away from the bar.
  - Q And what did you do at that point?
    - A I got out of the car. He got out of car and we had an argument.

2 I didn't want him to drive. I wanted to 3 drive. 4 Q And as a result of that argument, what 5 happened? 6 A He was driving and wanted me to get back 7 in the car, and I was nervous because my purse was 8 in the car. I didn't know how I was going to get 9 anywhere without my purse and cell phone and 10 driver's license. I had to fly back to Atlanta the 11 next day, and so I was concerned but I got back in 12 the car as a passenger. So when you leave -- was there a time 13 14 while you were standing having this argument with 15 him about driving where you were opposed to getting 16 back in the car? Yes, ma'am. 17 Α And eventually did you decide to get back 18 19 in the car? 20 Α I did. 21 Okay. So you get back in the car, and who Q 22 is driving now? 23 Α Peter is driving. 24 And where were you seated in the car? Q

The passenger seat. I was not wearing a

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About what?

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- seat belt, and I was facing the passenger window. 1 2 Why is that? 3 I was angry with him. Was there anyone else in the car with the 0 two of you? 5 No, ma'am. 6 A So you leave Fort Walton and as you -- do 8 you make any stops on the way from Fort Walton into the Gulf Breeze area? Now that I can remember. We just went 10 11 straight to Gulf Breeze. 12 Q And what road were you traveling down? 13 Α 98. While you were on 98, will you tell the 14 jury what happened? 15 There was a noise, and the car -- there 16 A 17 was a hit of something and the main thing I recall I was jostled because I didn't have my seat belt on 18 and the sun glass came in. 19
  - Q Is that the glass from the sun roof on the car?
- 22 A Yes, ma'am.

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Q And when the sun roof comes down or when you feel the hit and the glass comes down from the sun roof, are you still facing towards the window?

1	A The sun roof glass I remember.				
2	Q Is that the car that you guys were in that				
3	night?				
4	A I guess so, yes.				
5	Q All right. Once you feel this hit and the				
6	glass comes down, you said you turned forward, what				
7	did you do at that point?				
8	A I asked what happened.				
9	Q What was Mr. Armstrong's response?				
1.0	A I don't really think he said anything.				
11	Q Did he stop the car?				
12	A No, ma'am.				
13	Q What happened. Where did what did he				
14	do? Where did he go?				
15	A We just kept driving.				
16	Q Okay. I mean, are you are you asking				
17	any other questions or was that it? Just once, what				
18	happened? Drive north.				
19	A I think I may have asked several times				
20	what happened, what happened, many times.				
21	Q And did he ever respond to you?				
22-	A I don't believe so.				
23	Q Eventually do you turn into a neighborhood				
24	off of 98?				

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We did.

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- Q What neighborhood was that?
- A It was where he lived.

Q Okay. Once you turn off into the neighborhood, what happened from there?

A He said someone was following us and so he stopped the car and reached over and opened my door and pushed me out of the vehicle and then told me to get out and go, and then I saw the people that were following us get -- the man get out of his car, and Peter was out of his car and they were talking, and I heard him say, you hit someone on the bike, and then I saw Peter got back in the car and the man got in the car and he followed him.

- Q You said Peter got back in the car. Did Mr. Armstrong stay at that scene?
  - A No, ma'am.
  - Q Where were you left?
- A In the neighbor's house or yard. I was just in the yard.
- Q So what do you do at that point?
- A I just went and sat on this porch. Nobody seemed to be at the house and I sat for a while. I didn't know what to do, and I just went and walked down to where his house was and went and sat on his back porch.

1	Florida Department of Law Enforcement?				
2	A Twelve years.				
3	Q Twelve years, okay. Were you ?				
4	MS. KINSEY: May I approach the				
5	witness?				
6	THE COURT: Yes.				
7	Q (Ms. Kinsey) I am going to show you				
8	what's been introduced as State's Exhibit Number 6.				
9	Were you sent the blood of Peter Armstrong to				
10	identify whether or not there was a presence of any				
11	alcohol?				
12	A I was.				
13	Q Okay. Did you test that blood?				
14	A I did.				
15	Q Would you please tell the ladies and				
16	gentlemen what your results were for his blood				
17	alcohol level?				
18	A Okay. The blood alcohol level there's two				
19	results. It's tested twice. It's 0.173 and 0.174				
20	grams of ethyl alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.				
21	Q Why is it tested twice?				
22	A There's several reasons for that.				
23	Conducting an analyze more than once insures that				
24	accuracy of the test. It gives you two results that				
25	both have to agree with one another. It's also				

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

VOLUME III

PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG,

Defendant.

CASE NO.: 10-1469 CF

DIVISION: "C"

70 F AG 707

JURY TRIAL BEFORE

THE HONORABLE DAVID RIMMER

Proceedings held in the above-styled cause commencing on the 5th day of January, 2012, at the Santa Rosa County Courthouse, 6865 Caroline Street, Milton, Florida.

APPEARANCES

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

JENNIE KINSEY, ESQUIRE Assistant State Attorney

190 Government Street Pensacola, Florida 32502

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

ASHLEY SMITH HERNDON, ESQUIRE

Dewrell & Herndon

1261 A North Eglin Parkway Shalimar, Florida 32579

ALSO PRESENT:

PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG, DEFENDANT

REPORTED BY:

J. ELAINE TYREE, R.P.R.

Santa Rosa County Courthouse 6865 Caroline Street, Box H

Milton, Florida 32570

(850) 981-5596

7	PROCEEDINGS				
2	THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated.				
3	Okay. Where are we now?				
4	MS. HERNDON: Judge, at this point the Defense				
5	would rest.				
6	THE COURT: Okay. And your client does not				
7	wish to testify?				
8	MS. HERNDON: That is correct.				
9	THE COURT: Okay. I need to then inquire of				
10	Mr. Armstrong. Would you stand, please, sir, and				
11	raise your right hand?				
12	Do you swear or affirm the evidence you're				
13	going to give will be the truth, the whole truth,				
14	and nothing but the truth?				
15	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.				
16	Whereupon, the witness,				
17	PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG,				
18	having been duly sworn by the Court testified on his				
19	oath as follows:				
20	THE COURT: All right. Please state your name.				
21	THE DEFENDANT: Peter Felix Armstrong.				
22	THE COURT: All right. Sir, have you had a				
23	chance to discuss with your attorney whether or not				
24	you wish to testify in this case?				
25	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.				

1	THE COURT: And what is your decision?
2	THE DEFENDANT: I would not like to testify.
3	THE COURT: Okay. Do you realize that you have
4	the right to testify and, if you choose not to, the
5	State cannot make any comment on that and the jury
б	cannot draw any inferences from your decision not to
7	testify? Do you realize that?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
9	THE COURT: And of course if you do testify,
10	the State can cross examine you just like they can
11	any other witness. Do you understand that?
12	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
13	THE COURT: Okay. And do you feel that you
14	have been explained by your attorney the advantages
15	and disadvantages of testifying?
16	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
17	THE COURT: Okay. And is it your own personal
18	decision not to testify?
19	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
20	THE COURT: Do you feel that anybody has put
21	any pressure on you not to testify?
22	THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
23	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir. All right.
24	MS. HERNDON: Judge, at this time we would
25	renew our motion for judgment of acquittal.

Would the defendant and his counsel please rise and harken to the jury's verdict.

THE CLERK: We the jury find the defendant,

Peter Felix Armstrong, guilty of D.U.I. manslaughter
as charged in the Information.

As to Count 2, guilty of leaving the scene of a crash involving property damage, a lesser included offense, so say we all.

THE COURT: All right. Anything before I discharge the jury?

MS. HERNDON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your jury service. There's one last thing I want to do for you before you leave. And I want to give each of you a copy of the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. It's just a little thing that we give out to jurors as a token of our appreciation for your willingness to serve.

You can take it home, and you can see in there that under the Sixth Amendment everybody accused of a crime has a right to a fair and impartial jury and a public trial. And that's the part that you played in this case.

So again, thank you very much. And at this

ATTACHMENT # 4

# STATE OF FLORIDA IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 1st JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

-vs-

PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG

Defendant.

UCN: 572010CF001469XXAXMX Case Number: 10001469CFMXAX

OBTS#: 5701087141

### Judgment

☐ PROBATION VIOLATOR ☐ RESENTENCE ☐ COMMUNITY CONTROL VIOLATOR ☐ RETRIAL					
The defendant PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG being personally before the court represented by ASHLEY SMITH HERNDON, the attorney of record and the state represented by JENNIE MARIE KINSEY and having entered a plea of Nolo-Contendere to the following crime(s):					
SEQ#	CNT#	CHARGE			LVL DGR
· Freed	1	316.193.3c3a 316.193.1 316.193.3a3a 316.193.3b3a	DUI MANSLAUGHTER		Felony Second Degree
2	2	316.061	(LIO) LEAVING SCENE PROP DAMAGE	OF ACCIDENT WITH	Misdemeanor First Degree
3	3	316.193.3a1 316.193.3b1 316.193.3c1	DUI-DUBAL DAMAGE F SERIOUS INJUR	PROPERTY/PERSON W/O	Misdemeanor First Degree
4	4	316.193.3c1	DRIVING UNDER DAMAGE	INFLUENCE PROPERTY	Misdemeanor First Degree
COUNT 2 – A/G TIME SERVED IN COUNTY JAIL COUNT 3 – A/G 1 YEAR PROBATION FOLLOWING DOC SENTENCE COUNT 4 – A/G TIME SERVED IN COUNTY JAIL					
☐ ThePROBATIONCOMMUNITY CONTROL previously ordered in this case is revoked. ☐ The PRIOR ADJUDICATION OF GUILT IN THIS CASE IS CONFIRMED and no cause having been shown why the defendant should not be adjudicated guilty.					
It is ordered that the defendant is hereby Adjudicated Guilty of the above crime(s).,					

### STATE OF FLORIDA IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 1st JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG
Defendant.

UCN: 572010CF001469XXAXMX Case Number: 10001469CFMXAX

#### Sentence

As To Count 1

The defendant, being personally before this court, accompanied by the defendants' attorney of record, ASHLEY SMITH HERNDON and having been adjudicated guilty herin, and the court having given the defendant an opportunity to be heard and to offer matters in mitigation of sentence, and to show cause why the defendant should not be sentenced as provided by law, and no cause being shown,

(Check applicable provision)
and the court having on 03/20/2012 deferred imposition of sentence until this date
03/20/2012
and the court having previously entered a judgment in this case on now
resentences the defendant
TOWARD TOTAL BOY AND THE TOTAL
and the court having placed the defendant on probation/community control and having
subsequently revoked the defendant's probation/community control
subsequency revoked the desentant s probations continuinty control
IT IS SENTENCE OF THE COURT that:
The Defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
☐ The defendant pay a fine pursuant to section 775.083, Florida Statutes, plus a 5% surcharge
pursuant to section 950.25 Florida Statutes, as indicated on the Fine/Costs/Fee Page.
☐ The defendant is sentenced as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.04, Florida
Statutes.
TO BE IMPRISONED:
For a term of Minimum 4.00 year(s) Maximum 15.00 year(s) - COUNT 1 = 4 YEAR MIN/MAND
1 of a cold of Minimum 4.00 year(s) Maximum 13.00 year(s) = COUNT 1 3 4 1EAR MIN/MAND
·

In the event the defendant is ordered to serve additional split sentences, all incarcerations portions shall be satisfied before the defendant begins service to the supervision terms.

## STATE OF FLORIDA IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 1st JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

-vs-

PETER FELIX ARMSTRONG

Defendant.

UCN: 572010CF001469XXAXMX Case Number: 10001469CFMXAX

OBTS#: 5701087141

### Other Provisions

As To Count 1

It is further ordered that the defendant shall be allowed a total of 475.00 day(s) credit for such time incarcerated before imposition of this sentence.

#### ALL COUNTS CONCURRENT

	credit and to c	ctions shall apply the original compute and apply credit for t time awarded pursuant to sec	jail time (To be used for Resentencing ime served and the and after VOP and tion 944.275 Florida Statutes. (Pre
☐ The Depai	apply credit for service of inca	or time served and unfortified	jail time credit and to compute and gain time awarded during prior e pursuant to section 948.06 (6) Florida
Defendant is allowed credit for days credit county jail served between date of as a violator and date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall original jail credit awarded and shall compute and apply credit for actual tin served in prison and any earned and unfortified gain time awarded prior serven on:			
		CASE NO:	COUNT
		pursuant to section 944,276	Florida Statutes.

SANTA ROSA COUNTY
CLERK'S DEFICE
2012 MAR 20 PM 3-51

Defendant PETER FELL	IX ARMSTRONG Case Number 10-1469CF
Other Provision, continued	<u>d:</u>
Consecutive/Concurrent As To Other Counts	It is further order that the sentence imposed for this count shall run  (check one) consecutive to concurrent  with the sentence set forth in count of this case.
Consecutive/Concurrent As To Other Convictions	It is further ordered that the composite term of all sentences imposed for the counts specified in this order shall run (check one) consecutive to concurrent with the following: (check one) any active sentence being served.
	specific sentences:
other documents specified by  The defendant in op  of appeal within 30 days from	the department together with a copy of this judgment and sentence and any by the Florida Statute.  See a court was advised of the right to appeal from this sentence by filing notice om this date with the clerk of this court and the defendant's right to the right to appeal at the expense of the State on showing of indigency.
	ove sentence, the court further recommends ordered 50 hours community year Probation following DOC sentence
DONE AND ORDI This XX + X day of _	ERED in open court at Santa Rosa County, Florida,
	Judge Indige
Armstrong	

ATTACHMENT # 5

Γ	0873 Number 5701087(4)	ARREST / NOT	ICE TO APP		1. Arrest 2. Notice to Appear	1	<b>* V</b>				
	FLD 5400HP5	1 200-11-07-11-07-1	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		EHPA1	100FF049	975				
TATIVE	Charge Type		5. ORDINANCE 6. OTHER	•	Agency Arrest Number FHPA100FF049975						
MIST	Location of Arrest (Include Name of Bushess) 4737 BAY BREEZE DR, GULF BRE	Wespon Scized Type		US-98	seco Namo Address)	RIVE, MIL					
\$	Date of Arrest 11/27/2010 Time of Arrest 1:24 AM	Booling Date Booking Tim		José Tirmo	Elevanteinted	By:					
	Juli Blumbor Goomby ID Number	Other Local Humber	FOLE Number	DOC N	Criminek	FBI Number					
<u>                                     </u>	Name (List, Fird, Middle) ARMSTRONG, F	PETER EELIY		Alies							
	Race Sex Date of Birth or Ag	9/1982 Height 6-(	01 180	Eye Color	Hair Color	Complexion	Build ALE CO				
	W-White I-American Indian W M 07/1 B-Black O-Oriental/Assan W M 07/1 Scara, Marks, Tattoos, Unique Physical Features (Location, Type, Description)		31   100	Brow	n Brown	MED Indication of	MED     A B 以				
M	Local Address (Street, Apl. Number) (City	None (State	(QIZ)).	Pisone		Alcohol Influence Drug Influence Residence Type					
DEFER	Permanent Address (Sprey Schlümber) LL ROAD, GUL	)	(Zp)	,Eboope	700 0070	2. County 4	Floring 2				
	1/50 KELL ROAD, GUL Business Address (Name, Street) (City		2563 ) (Zp)	Phone	729-8679	Decupation	LICENSE				
	Onlywe's Licence Street Hungary		INS Number	( )	Prece of Birth	N Ic	one				
-	Shiver's License State / Number Florida / A652-666-82-259-0		Į	Race Sex	FLORII	DA	USA				
SO-DEF	Cn-Defendent Nerne (Last, First, Middle)			Race Sex	Date of Birth or Age		☐ 3. Felony ☐ 4. Misdernessor ☐ 5. Juvenile				
L		A Manufacture/ Z. Other	Type	Barbiturate	H. Hallucinogen	1. Arrested 2. At Large P. Paraphemalia/	☐3. Felony ☐4. Misdemellinor ☐5. Jovenile U. Unknown				
CODE	91. N/A B. Buy D. Deliver Distribute  P. Possess 1. Traffic E. Usa	Produce/	N.N/A C.	Cocaine Heroin	M. Manjuana O. Opkim/Deriv.	Equipment S. Synthelic	Z. Other on of Section (ORD)				
	D.U.I. MANSLAUGHTER	7 SF.S. □Ord.		5.193(3) (a	a)(b)(c) 3						
CHARG	Activity / Orug NP/A Amountunit N		State Attorney Number	1		2010	Order of Arrest				
L	IFFC DCaptas DAC DBW 1706-XBPW			Writ. Azt.	□ Dornsetic Vio	5	二二二				
]	LEAVING SCENE OF CRASH WITH DI	EATH SE	Statute Violation Humber	316.027		Aloum	on of Section (CRD)				
CHARG	ACCUMENTA DATE NO.		State Attorney Number	Court Num		<del></del>					
L	# 9516-SSB		*	Writ. Arc.	□ Domestiz Vio	ımı. U	Donner of Arress				
Γ	The undersigned certifies and tweets that he sha lust and reasonable on the 26th day of November 201		hat the above named Defend . (Specifically include fac			<del></del>	m=				
	Peter Felix Armstrong was traveling west on US-	98 in the community of 1	Midway near the Fu	ıller Drive int	ersection. Armstro	ng had one pa	ssenger in the				
-	vehicle with him, Ms. Brittany Leigh Stanley. Paul Lee Shirley was on his bicycle traveling west on the US-98 shoulder in the community of Midway										
ENT	near the Fulier Road intersection. Shirley had a r	ed lamp on the rear of his	s bicycle and a clea	r light on his l	head. Armstrong v	eered onto the	US-98 west-				
TATEM	bound lane shoulder and struck the rear of Shirley	's bicycle. Shirley and h	is bicycle were thro	own forward a	and came to final re	est on the US-	98 westbound				
AUSES	lane shoulder. Armstrong then left the scene of the			······································							
SALEC	follow Armstrong. Armstrong traveled approxim										
PROBAB	confronted a witness that had been following him			······································							
	his vehicle and pushed his passenger, Brittany Sta Armstrong traveled into the driveway of 4737 Ba			············							
	(Trooper Chris Roper is the crash investigator on	×									
	of his driveway. When Avalos ask Armstron	P.C	. Exists for Charge(s)	Judge's Sig	malife	Date					
	B. Mandatory Appearance Location (Court, Room Number, Address)										
AFFEAF	with instructions on Ism	04		2011		9:00	MAM. OPM.				
101 10	LANCE TO LOCALE AT THE THE AND DIAGE OCCUPANTED				4 514512	,,					
HOH	Signature of Defendent / Javenile and Person or Custodian			1							
-	Bit Mirenda Hold for Other Agency Viscoing Marcon	Verified By		11/27/2	010 \$55	000.00 s	100,000.00				
ATIVE	A A Mar Park		NO LE	ond Type 3. Surery ROR 4. Ball/		Туз					
TRATE	I swear or affirm the above and reverse and attached statements are	Swom to and subscribed before m		Cesh Bond Inturnable Court Date 01/04	4/2011	teturnable Court Time 9:0	) am				
NAME	Les Monnell	spred authority this		letense Date		telease Time					
1	Officer's / Complaint of Signature	Name / Tide of Person Authorized	X (DIOY 9				-				
		£50117.		,			of 2				
		, J	, <del></del>	1							

### NARRATIVE CONTINUATION

Agency De	4, H, P, 0	5	Agency Name		FLORID	A HIGHWA	Y PATROL	Aper	Report Number	IPA100F	-0499	975	
	2,7,1,0	Case Re	(erecce			ARMST	RONG, F					***************************************	
Breez	e Drive inter	secti	on. The S	Santa Ro	osa Co	ounty Sh	neriff's De	partr	nent resp	onded to	the a	rea to l	ocate
Arms	trong and his	pass	senger. S	hirley die	ed at t	the scen	e of this	crash	due to th	ne injuries	he re	ceived	when
	Armstrong's vehicle struck his bicycle. The Sheriff's deputys located Stanley at Armstrong's address and located Armstrong in the area of 5283 Soundside Drive. Both Armstrong and Stanley where transported to the Bay Breeze Drive crash scene. Both Stanley and Avalos identified Armstrong as the driver in both												
locate													
the B													
crashes. I placed Armstrong under arrest for leaving the scene of a crash involving death. As I talked to											ced to		
Arms	Armstrong, he had the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath. He had received several small cuts										cuts		
and s	and scratches when he had ran through the woods. Armstrong's eyes were bloodshot and watery. He												
seem	seemed to have trouble holding his eye lids open. Armstrong's face was red and his speech was slurred,										urred.		
Wher	n Armstrong s	stood	l stationar	y, he sw	ayed	baçk ar	d forth.	LifeG	uard Am	bulance S	ervice	e arrive	d and
obtai	ned a blood s	samp	le from A	rmstrong	ı. Tro	oper Ro	per trans	porte	d Armstro	ong to the	coun	ty jail.	While
at the	e jail, I told A	rmst	rong that	I had fin	ished	my cras	h investi	gatior	n and wa	s now cor	ıducti	ng a cr	iminal
inves	tigation into [	DUI.	I then rea	ad Armstr	rong h	nis rights	and he s	tated	he unde	erstood his	rights	s. Arms	strong
atten	ipted FSTs in	n the	jail TV a	rea. (Re	sults	of FST's	listed in	my D	UI detec	tion report	) 1 to	old Arms	strong
he w	as now unde	er an	rest for D	UI also.	l re:	ad and	explained	imp	lied cons	sent warni	ngs t	o Arms	trong.
Arms	trong refused	j of t	jive a san	rple of hi	is brea	ath on 1	1/27/2010	at 3	3:12 AM.	Armstron	g refu	sed to	give a
state	ment referenc	ce bo	th crashe	s.		MATERIA (1997)							
<u>                                    </u>													
AHRA													
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Case Sta	us	Citater	се Туре	A-Au		Date Cleared			Arrest Number D	100FF04	9975	Number	r Arrested
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